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Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the govern-
ment can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has
chosen. We study the government’s problem when credibility is an issue. We find
that several of the standard predictions of the economic model of crime and pun-
ishment are robust to commitment, but that credibility may in some cases result
in lower apprehension rates, and hence a higher crime rate, compared to the static
version of the model.
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The interaction between government and criminals follows a natural sequential 
structure. The government sets fines, sentences, and apprehension rates, which are 
observed by potential criminals, who then decide to whether or not to engage in criminal 
acts. Once a crime has been committed, the government has to carry out its promised 
policy. While this sequence of events describing the interactions between criminals and 
policy-makers is obvious, it is typically suppressed in economic models of crime and 
punishment. This is tantamount to assuming that government policies are credible, and 
that the government faces no pressure to deviate from its enforcement plans once they are 
announced.  
The potential difficulty is that, once a criminal has decided whether or not to 
commit a crime given the government’s announced punishment plan, the social benefits 
from the enforcement policy have been completely realized with respect to that 
individual. And because apprehension of criminals is costly, the government may have an 
incentive to renege on the announced policy. In this way, the government may reap the 
full benefits from the policy, while at the same time avoiding some enforcement costs. 
The government faces essentially the same credibility issues when deciding how severely 
to punish a criminal once he is apprehended.  Of course, criminal enforcement is not a 
one-shot game but is repeated with each offense that is committed.  Thus, the 
government’s behavior at any point in time is a signal of what it will do in the future, 
which allows it to establish a reputation for credibility. 
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 With these issues in mind, we study the standard economic model of crime and 
punishment within the context of an infinitely-repeated stage game played by potential 
criminals and the government. The methodology is essentially the same employed in the 
study of time-consistent policy in macroeconomics.1  Somewhat surprisingly, we find 
that the optimal static enforcement policies – maximal fines and jail sentences, with 
minimal apprehension probabilities2 – are, under plausible conditions, generally credible. 
We do find, however, that commitment problems may result in lower apprehension 
probabilities compared to the static model. These results are developed in the paper as 
follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 examines a fine-only punishment regime, 
and section 4 expands the model to include jail sentences. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
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 q=probability of apprehension and conviction; 
 
 f=fine upon conviction; 
 
 j=jail term as measured by the disutility to offenders; 
 
 α=unit cost to society of j;  
 
                                                          
1 The literature begins with Kydland and Prescott (1977). See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 16,  
for an overview. Rogoff (1989) surveys the literature.  
2 The seminal paper is Becker (1968); see the recent review article by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a 
comprehensive discussion.  
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 b=offender’s benefit of committing a crime, distributed according to G(b); 
 D=damages caused by crime. 
In (1), the H(⋅) function captures the net benefits of deterrence, the second term is 
the expected cost of imposing a jail sentence, and the final term is the cost of 
apprehension.  Standard economic models of criminal enforcement view the enforcer as 
choosing q, f, and j to maximize (1) subject to f≤fm and j≤jm, where fm and jm are upper 
bounds on the fine and jail term.  (For example, fm could be the offender’s wealth and jm 
his life span.)   
 The following results are well-established in the literature on optimal criminal 
enforcement (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).  First, when a fine is used, whether or not in 
combination with jail, it is always optimal to set f=fm since there is no social cost of 
increasing the fine.  Second, if jail alone is used in combination with q (i.e., f≡0), it is also 
optimal to set j=jm.  Even though jail is costly, only convicted offenders are imprisoned.  
Thus, by raising j and lowering q to keep qj constant, deterrence and expected 
punishment costs remain the same, but enforcement costs fall.  As a result, welfare is 
increased by raising  j as high as possible.  Finally, if jail and fines are both used in 
combination with q, optimal punishment continues to require f=fm, but it is no longer 
necessarily optimal to set j=jm.  
 What this static model ignores, and what has apparently not been addressed in the 
literature, is the possible time-inconsistency problem in criminal enforcement.  That is, it 
may not be optimal for the enforcement authority to carry out the announced policy as 
described above.  Although this problem may not arise for fines because they are costless 
to impose, it is a potentially serious problem for the announced apprehension rate and jail 
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term because, once a crime has been committed, it is costly to carry out these threats.  
Thus, there may be an incentive to renege on the optimal policy.   
 To illustrate, suppose the enforcement authority announces the optimal static 
policy (q*,fm,j*) as described above.  If the policy is believable, offenders respond by 
committing crimes if b≥q*(fm+j*), which achieves the desired level of deterrence.  It is 
now up to the enforcer to actually carry out the policy given that some crimes have been 
committed.  If it does, realized welfare is 
 *)(***))](*(1[*))(*(*),*,( qcjqjfqGjfqHjfqW mmm −+−−+= α  (2) 
which is just (1) evaluated at the optimal policy.  However, if the enforcer reneges on the 
policy by setting q=0, realized social welfare is 
  *))(*(*),*,(~ jfqHjfqW mm +=      (3) 
which clearly is higher than (2) since the costs of apprehension and imprisonment are 
avoided. 
 The problem, of course, is that offenders will anticipate the enforcer’s strategy 
and behave as if q=0, regardless of the announced policy.  In that case, offenders will 
commit crimes if b>0, and realized social welfare will be 
  )0(*),*,(ˆ HjfqW m =        (4) 
which must be less than *),*,(~ jfqW m  for q*>0.   
 In the static model of law enforcement, this credibility problem is ignored.  Here 
we explicitly address it in the context of a dynamic (multi-period) model in which the 
enforcer seeks to establish a reputation for carrying out its promised policy.  Our 
methodology is essentially that described in Lungqvist and Sargent (2000).  Specifically, 
consider the following sequence of events: 
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1. The enforcer announces a policy (q,f,j), where q∈[0,1], f∈[0,fm], and j∈[0,jm]; 
2. Potential offenders decide whether or not to commit crimes; 
3. The enforcer decides whether or not to carry out the announced policy; 
4. The sequence repeats in the next period. 
 In this context, we look for an enforcement policy (or set of policies) that the 
enforcer will credibly carry out over an infinite time horizon.  A credible policy is one for 
which the present value of social welfare from continued adherence to the policy exceeds 
the one-time gain from deviating. For an arbitrary announced policy (q,f,j), the present 
value of adherence forever equals 
  W(q,f,j) + δW(q,f,j) + δ2W(q,f,j) + … = δ−1
),,( jfqW       (5) 
where δ<1  is the discount factor.  Recall that reneging on the policy involves setting q 
and/or j=0 to save on enforcement costs,3 given that crimes have already been committed 
in the current period.  This yields welfare of W~ (q,f,j) in the current period but Wˆ (q,f,j) in 
all periods thereafter as offenders correctly anticipate the enforcer’s strategy.  The present 
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)0())(( HjfqH       (6) 
The announced policy is enforceable if (5) exceeds (6), or, after rearranging, if 
  W(q,f,j) ≥ (1−δ)H(q(f+j)) + δH(0)     (7) 
                                                          
3 Obviously, once q=0, the value of j becomes irrelevant. 
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We will refer to (7) as the credibility condition.  (Note that the left-hand side of this 
condition is itself social welfare.)  In the dynamic model, the optimal enforcement policy 
involves choosing q, f, and j to maximize welfare in (1) subject to (7).  
 
3. Fines Alone 
 We first examine a fine-only punishment scheme (i.e., j≡0).  Recall that there is 
no commitment problem regarding the magnitude of f since it is costless to impose.  In 
this sense,  f=fm is consistent with a credible policy.  The question therefore solely 
concerns the choice of q.   
 Social welfare in this case is 
  W(q,fm,0) = H(qfm) − c(q)      (8) 
while the credibility condition is 
  H(qfm) − c(q) ≥ (1−δ)H(qfm) + δH(0)     (9) 
Our principal result is as follows: 
Proposition 1: In a fine-only punishment scheme, the optimal static policy (q*,fm) is 
credible if and only if the discount factor exceeds a critical value δc  that is strictly 
between zero and one. 
Proof:  We first show that (9), evaluated at the optimal static policy, holds for δ=1 but 
not for δ=0.  When δ=1 (9) becomes 
   H(q*fm) − c(q*) ≥ H(0)  
which holds for q*≥0, whereas for δ=0 (9) is 
   H(q*fm) − c(q*) ≥ H(q*fm) 
 7
which clearly does not hold for q*>0.  Now, since the right-hand side of (9) is decreasing 
in δ (given H(q*fm)>H(0)), there exists a critical value δc, strictly between zero and one, 
such that (9) holds for δ≥δc but does not hold for δ<δc.  Q.E.D. 
As an example, let b be uniformly distributed on [0,b ] and let c(q)=q2/2.  In this case, 







= .       (10) 
Substituting this value for q into the credibility condition (9) and re-arranging shows that 






,       (11)   
where δc is clearly between zero and one.  Note that δc is increasing in b  and decreasing 
in fm.  Thus, an increase in the upper bound on b makes it less likely that q* is 
supportable as an equilibrium.  This is true because a larger b  increases the social benefit 
of crime and hence reduces the value of deterrence.  In contrast, an increase in the 
maximum possible fine makes it easier to support q* as an equilibrium.  This is true 
because the larger maximal fine reduces the enforcer’s need to rely on costly 
apprehension to achieve a given level of deterrence.  
 Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 for the general case.  The curve labeled W 
represents social welfare and also the left-hand side of the credibility condition (9), while 
the curves labeled by δ represent different values for the right-hand side of (9).4  Note 
that these curves shift up as δ decreases.  While the static optimum q* occurs at the 
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highest point on the W curve, the dynamic optimum occurs at the highest point on W such 
that W is above the corresponding δ -curve.  As Proposition 1 showed, this optimum 
coincides with the static optimum (q*) for δ≥δc, but for lower values of δ, the 
dynamically optimal apprehension rate is lower than q*.  Thus, for δ<δc, the crime rate in 
the dynamic model will be higher than in the static model.  
To illustrate in the context of the uniform distribution example from above, for a 
sufficiently small value of δ  so that constraint (9) binds we can solve (9) directly for the 










=′       (12) 
This rate is positively related to the discount factor and goes to zero as δ goes to zero.  
Thus, since the fine is fixed at its maximum value, the apprehension rate also falls as the 
discount factor gets smaller.  Finally, it is easy to verify that q′(δc)=q*. 
 
4. Jail 
The addition of jail as a punishment option (with or without a fine) complicates 
matters because it adds another stage to the enforcement decision.  Specifically, once an 
offender has been apprehended, it may not be credible to impose the promised jail term. 
To examine this additional credibility problem, we begin with the case of jail alone (f≡0) 
and ask whether a maximal jail term ( j=jm) is optimal as in the static model.  Later, we 
consider jail in combination with fines. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 For δ<1, the δ-curve reaches a maximum at the point where H′(qfm)=0.  Using the definition of H(⋅), this 
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A. Jail Alone  
 Consider an announced policy (q,j).  From (7), credibility of the overall policy 
(with f=0) requires that 
  H(qj)− [1−G(qj)]qαj − c(q) ≥ (1−δ)H(qj)+δH(0)   (13) 
where the left-hand side of (13) is also welfare in this context. Now suppose that an 
offender has been apprehended.  If the enforcer imposes the announced jail term, realized 
welfare is W(q,0,j).  However if he reneges, realized welfare is 
  ),0,(~ jqW − c(q) = H(qj) − c(q)     (14) 
which differs from (3) by the subtraction of c(q), reflecting the sunk cost of apprehension.  
Failure to impose j at this point saves punishment costs, but realized welfare in all 
subsequent periods is 
  Wˆ (q,0,j) − c(q) = H(0) − c(q)     (15) 
Using these expressions to form the credibility conditions for j yields 
  H(qj)− [1−G(qj)]qαj ≥ (1−δ)H(qj)+δH(0)    (16) 
It should be clear that (13) implies (16) because c(q) is not subtracted from the left-hand 
side of (16).  Thus, we have 
Lemma 1:  In a jail-only punishment scheme, if (q,j) is a credible enforcement policy 
before apprehension, then j is credible after apprehension.   
It follows that in deriving the optimal dynamic policy involving jail we can ignore (16) 
and simply maximize welfare subject to (13).  Given this, we have the following result: 
Proposition 2: In a jail-only punishment scheme, the optimal dynamic policy involves 
j=jm; that is, the jail term is maximal. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
occurs where q=D/fm as shown in Figure 1. 
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Proof:  Suppose j<jm.  Now lower q and raise j so that the expected jail term, qj, remains 
constant.  Note that this increases the left-hand side of (13) (because apprehension costs 
fall while expected punishment costs and deterrence remain constant), whereas the right-
hand side is unchanged. Thus, welfare increases without violating the credibility 
condition.  It follows that j<jm could not have been optimal.  Q.E.D. 
This result shows that the optimal static policy of imposing a maximal jail term is 
also credible in the dynamic model.  However, as in the fine-only case, the optimal 
apprehension rate may be lower than in the static model, in which case case the crime 
rate will be higher.  
B. Fines and Jail 
 Finally, consider the most general case in which the enforcer can use fines in 
combination with jail.  Observe first that, for reasons noted above, the fine should always 
be set at its maximal level before any jail term is imposed.  Thus, given f=fm, q and j are 
chosen simultaneously to maximize welfare subject to credibility.   
As we showed in the jail-only case, credibility of the overall policy (q,fm,j) is 
sufficient to ensure credibility of j once the offender is apprehended.  (That is, lemma 1 
holds here as well.) The optimal dynamic policy therefore maximizes 
   H(q(fm+j))− [1−G(q(fm+ j))]qαj − c(q)   (17) 
subject to 
  H(q(fm+j))− [1−G(q(fm+j)]qαj − c(q) ≥ (1−δ)H(q(fm+j))+δH(0) (18) 
As noted above, it is not generally true in the static model that the optimal jail term is 
maximal when both fines and jail are used. Thus, let the optimal static policy (i.e., the 
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policy that maximizes (17)) be given by (q*,fm,j*) where q*>0 and j*≤jm.  Then we can 
prove the analog to Proposition 1: 
Proposition 3:  In the general enforcement scheme, the optimal static policy (q*,fm,j*) is 
credible if and only if δ exceeds a critical value that is strictly between zero and one. 
Proof:  Clearly, (18) holds if δ=1 but not for δ=0 (given q*>0).  And since the right-hand 
side of (18) is decreasing in δ, there exists a critical value of δ strictly between zero and 
one such that (18) holds if and only if δ exceeds this value.  Q.E.D.         
Based on this result, the optimal dynamic policy entails an expected punishment 
q(fm+j)≤q*(fm+j*).  Thus, as in all previous cases, the crime rate in the dynamic model 
will tend to be higher than in the static model, again reflecting the cost of credibility. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Our results demonstrate that commitment issues do not fundamentally change 
optimal fines and sentences derived in the standard static economic model of crime and 
punishment. In retrospect, this is not surprising as the essential economic effect driving 
the static model has not changed: it is still the case that, by raising fines/sentences and 
lowering apprehension rates, the government can most cheaply maintain a level of 
deterrence while at the same time lowering the costs of enforcing it. 
 We do find, however, that when the government is sufficiently short-cited, the 
probability of apprehension will be lower than in the traditional static model.  Further, the 
more heavily the government weighs the present relative to the future, the lower will be 
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Figure 1. Condition for the optimal static apprehension rate to be credible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
